A LEVINASIAN READING OF SHAKESPEARE’S THE WINTER’S TALE AND SARAH KANE’S PHAEDRA’S LOVE

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Abstract: This research aims to compare Shakespeare’s The Winter’s Tale (1623) with Kane’s Phaedra’s Love (1996) from the viewpoint of Levinas and his ideas on the relationship between being and the Other expressed in his pivotal work Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1978). The central events of the two plays are analyzed based on the text to flesh out the similarities and differences the two playwrights have with regard to their treatment of the approach of the Other. Of the highest importance in the analysis is how the characters of the plays deal with responsibility for the Other, and also how they react to the wonder of facing the Other. It is concluded that, in Shakespeare’s play, the characters mostly do not carry out their ethical responsibility, and those who do are not treated well; as the play progresses, however, they start to take responsibility for one another which leads to a mostly happy ending. In Kane’s play, by contrast, there is no happy ending because the vast majority of characters do not realize their responsibility, and thus, their wonder at facing the Other turns extremely violent. Additionally, even those characters that come to terms with their responsibility undergo the same gruesome fate as those who do not embody ethical responsibility.

Keywords: Responsibility, Being, the Other, Violence

Introduction
Levinas observes that being’s “essence is interest”, further explicating by saying that “Being’s interest takes dramatic form in egoisms struggling with one another, each against all”; Levinas thus begins to formulate his ideas of “otherwise than being” in this manner, yet later insinuates that the interest mentioned and the struggle it instigates is a flawed argument because being is always assumed as “assembled,
present, in a present that is extended, by memory and history” (4-5). These views are influential in the choice to analyze Shakespeare’s *The Winter’s Tale* and Kane’s *Phaedra’s Love*. The two plays might at first glance be viewed as different enough to refuse the attempt at comparison, one being a comedy and romance and the other a tragedy; however, it should be remembered that Shakespeare’s play has substantial tragic elements such as the death of Mamilius and Hermione in addition to the suffering Leontes is subjected to as a result of his shirking his responsibility towards others. As such, while Kane’s play is much more brutal, Shakespeare does not in any way allow his characters to proceed without trials and tribulations. The Self/Other conflict is dealt with quite differently in the work of the two writers; for example, Leontes does not react well to the approach of the Other (Hermione) yet does not resort to violence, whereas Theseus in Kane’s play unknowingly rapes his own daughter in the confusion of the hanging ceremony. These examples highlight the different treatments that Levinas’ idea of the *otherwise-than-being* receives in the two works, which in turn indicates the changing views on conflict with the Other as one moves away from Shakespearean works towards postmodern plays. Additionally, the final contact with the Other in the two plays is quite significant when one considers what Levinas calls “transcendence” (3) and “responsibility for the other” (10); Hippolytus is disillusioned because he realizes that as a result of the hypocrisy around him he cannot transcend being through responsibility for the Other so he simply gives up and decides to act out in a decadent manner and becomes sexually deviant resorting to violence, whereas Leontes does not reach the same levels of self-awareness as Hippolytus and simply shirks his responsibility for the Other (Hermione). Regarding two other plays by these two playwrights Saunders explains that “one of the key ideas that governs both *King Lear* and *Blasted* is the relationship established between acts of personal cruelty and the full-scale chaos and atrocities that arise out of civil war” (71) which is an indication of similarities existing between Shakespeare and Kane. Furthermore, Greenblatt believed that in the 16th century people started to change their identities to fit their circumstances; additionally, he is said to have viewed the Renaissance as the “early modern period” with Shakespearean characters...showing signs of modernity which suggests that the “period involved a forward-looking attitude that prefigured our own modern world” (qtd. in Brotton 16-17). The aforementioned justifies a comparison between Shakespeare and Kane to discuss exactly how the early modern period prefigured the modern and postmodern with regards to the treatment of the Other.
This research will rely on Levinas’ seminal work *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* to decode the complex relationships in the two works. A comparison will be made based on how the characters portray subjectivity and the various other concepts that Levinas mentions such as responsibility for the Other with the aim of coming to a conclusion about how characterization changes in Kane’s work when contrasted with Shakespeare. A close reading of the texts is necessary to chart how the characters achieve (or fail to achieve) transcendence and subjectivity, and whether or not they react to the approach of the Other based on Levinasian ideas. The close reading will consist of analyzing the character dialogues in order to ascertain how they change and develop. In Shakespeare’s play, the main characters provide the most fertile ground for comparison much like Kane’s, and because of the added exposure and much more comprehensive dialogue, the focus will mainly be on the most influential characters. However, where necessary, minor characters will also be put under scrutiny to do justice to the overall tapestry of the two plays. Aiding in comparison is the fact that both of the plays revolve around nobility which provides stable and common grounds for a side-by-side analysis even though Kane’s portrayal of nobility is much cruder than Shakespeare’s regulated depiction of nobility. The ultimate aim is to show that the approach of the Other and the wonder it causes through creating subjectivity ends in completely different manners in the two plays, one in reconciliation and the other in violence.

Levinas explains that the “*otherwise than being* cannot be situated in any eternal order extracted from time”, further noting that “Subjectivity is a node and a denouement - of essence and essence’s other” (9-10). Levinas says that essence “fills the said, or the epos, of the saying, but the saying, in its power of equivocation, that is, in the enigma whose secret it keeps, escapes the epos of essence that includes it”; so, this otherwise than being that has been sought from the beginning, “as soon as it is conveyed before us it is betrayed in the said that dominates the saying which states it” (7). As such, the allusive Other goes beyond time and thus the said and much like saying escapes essence. If the ego is unicity which cannot “find any rest in itself”, therefore, Levinas states, the “outside of itself, the difference from oneself of this unicity is non-indifference itself” (8). The aforesaid provides an understanding of the concept of the Other. Levinas then defines responsibility as that which “answers for the freedom of another”, as well as the “locus in which is situated the null-site of subjectivity”; it also substitutes “me for the other as hostage” (10-11).

Levinas says:
Irreducible to being's essence is the substitution in responsibility, signification or the one-for-another, or the defecting of the ego beyond every defeat, going countercurrent to a conatus, or goodness...The intention toward another, when it has reached its peak, turns out to belie intentionality. Toward another culminates in a for another, a suffering for his suffering...without measure...To reduce the good to being, to its calculations and its history, is to nullify goodness... (18)

Levinas observed that the “beyond being, being’s other or the otherwise than being...expressed as infinity, has been recognized as the Good by Plato” (19) so to “deduce from the concept and from history the subjectivity [is] to forget what is better than being, that is, the Good” (18). Therefore, one has to accept without condition the Good, or the Other, which in turn necessitates a carrying out of responsibility toward the Other immediately which itself is also called for by the immediacy and intimacy of the face of the Other.

The Other: A Discussion

History, Will, and Choice
The Winter’s Tale begins with a discussion between Camillo and Archidamus of Sicilia and Bohemia respectively; Camillo states that “They were train’d together in their childhoods; and there rooted betwixt them then such an affection which cannot choose but branch now” (Shakespeare 1.1.19-21). In Levinasian terms, Camillo’s words are problematic as he foresees a bright future for the two kings based on their history. Levinas explains that the responsibility one has for the other cannot be thought to have root in one’s commitment or decision (10), so when Camillo cites Leontes and Polixenes’ past it can be viewed as a foreshadowing of the fact that this relationship will not have a pleasant outcome as the two kings’ responsibility for one another is based on history and therefore a choice effected by that history; their duty to one another is not laid on a foundation of the type of responsibility Levinasian ethics require, the type of responsibility which requires substitution for the other as “hostage” (Levinas 11) which predates any history, will or choice and even consciousness. The history Camillo converses about hints at “the-one-for-the-other” (Levinas 136) as being a commitment, but Levinas’ ideas state the exact opposite to such beliefs. Camillo also states that Leontes intends to “pay Bohemia the visitation which he justly owes him” (Shakespeare 1.1.6) which supports the aforementioned analysis as the word “owes” yet again
indicates a conscious choice which is in contrast to the type of responsibility Levinas explains.

In Phaedra’s Love, the first dialogue of the play occurs between the Doctor and Phaedra. The doctor asks whether Hippolytus has any friends to which Phaedra answers that “He’s a prince” (Kane 67); her answer side-steps the question to defend Hippolytus’ apparent shortcomings which in turn seems to suggest that Phaedra is taking responsibility for the Other (Hippolytus) thereby being ethically sound as far as Levinasian ideas dictate. However, as she finds fault with the Doctor rather than acknowledge the fact that something is seemingly ailing Hippolytus, she creates conflict with a third party, the Doctor, instead of employing behavior with any sense of justice. Levinas clarifies that “an approach is to be with another for or against a third party, with the other and the third party against oneself, in justice”, further noting that to be responsible for the Other is also to be responsible for the third party which allows justice to take shape (16). Phaedra blindingly defending Hippolytus may seem to be ethical as she is holding herself responsible for shouldering the weight of Hippolytus’ faults, but because she does not treat the Doctor (third party) justly, she has not achieved the transcendence Levinas speaks of. Furthermore, as will later be discussed, Hippolytus is the only character who resembles the ethical being Levinas discusses because the reason for his disillusion is the fact that no one takes responsibility for the Other and he himself has become one with the crowd in a sort of passive defiance. Thus, Phaedra’s actions are misguided at best because she does not evaluate Hippolytus or the Doctor in a just manner. Phaedra does not embody what Levinas called the Despite Oneself which entails one being open to the “possibility of pain, a sensibility which of itself is the susceptibility to being hurt, a self uncovered” (51); it is not because of her concern for Hippolytus that Phaedra defends him, but because she cannot bear the truth being exposed about the true nature of her affections.

Lehnhof states:

Arresting all egoism, the encounter with the other makes me responsible—not because I accept responsibility—but because the mere existence of the other makes this responsibility incumbent upon me. (487)

Therefore, gaining subjectivity requires the aforementioned. However, thus far, none of the characters of the two plays suggest the potential for such an outcome as responsibility seems to be portrayed as the byproduct of choice.
Justice and the third party

Polixenes indicates that his relationship with Leontes may once have been based on the kind of responsibility Levinas talks about when he says that he and Leontes were “twin’d lambs...what we chang’d was innocence for innocence; we knew not the doctrine of ill doing” (Shakespeare 1.2.66-69); however, it is later explained that they have since changed from that state, and when Leontes starts to put his suspicions into words by saying “to be paddling palms and pinching fingers...that is entertainment my bosom likes not” (Shakespeare 1.2.115-119), it becomes clear that he does not have the markers of someone who has accepted the faults of the Other who has approached him, which could be Polixenes or Hermione, nor has he acted in accordance with any sense of justice concerning the third party which again could be either Polixenes or Hermione. Levinas explains that the “third party troubles it [subject] by demanding justice in the ‘unity of transcendental consciousness’” (82); so, whereas the approach of the Other (responsibility) is characterized by something beyond and prior to consciousness, the event of coming across a third party requires consciousness to conjure up justice. As such, because Leontes does not make any conscious effort to employ any justice and nor try to come up with a rational response to Polixenes and Hermione’s behavior, it can be concluded that his behavior is less than ethical and he does not embody the sort of unconditional responsibility nor does he obtain any level of consciousness of the type of justice the third party requires.

Levinas elaborates on sensibility saying that “the-one-for-another has the form of sensibility or vulnerability...psyche in the form of a hand that gives even the bread taken from its own mouth. Here the psyche is the maternal body” (69). According to the aforesaid, when Phaedra reacts angrily to Strophe’s approach, “Go away fuck off” (Kane 69), she has none of the indicators of the one-for-another that Levinas mentions as she does seem like someone who would sacrifice for her daughter even though she is willing to support her stepson. Therefore, if Strophe is taken to be the third party, Phaedra does not act based on justice where Strophe’s rights are concerned, and her approach is shunned. As was previously mentioned, Phaedra fails to gain subjectivity because of her treatment of her relationship with Hippolytus, and now she fails to consciously act in a just manner with regards to Strophe’s approach, and so it can be said that her actions are thus far completely unethical. Rosato elucidates maternity as the “perfect image of vulnerability...because of the physical susceptibility of a mother’s body
to the ‘other’—...the baby—whom she carries. Without any initiative on her part, the baby forms himself within her, making her responsible for his needs” (352). Rosato’s view supports the fact that Phaedra, in relation to Strophe, lacks any vulnerability, and as such, she cannot be seen as having gained subjectivity as far as Levinasian thought is concerned as she eschews her maternal instincts and responsibilities, at the very least, for the time being. Essentially, in both plays thus far, the justice the third party requires is refused and the conflicted characters resist going beyond their being and self through passivity toward the Other’s approach.

Leontes dismisses Camillo’s justification for the way Polixenes and Hermione act by rhetorically asking whether “leaning cheek to cheek...meeting noses...Kissing with inside lip” is nothing, also explaining that he “wears her like his medal” (Shakespeare 1.2.285-307). Leontes fails to realize this as Hermione’s graciousness as a hostess; Levinas clarifies the dehiscence of proximity by saying that it is “the-one-for-the-other, exposedness of self to another, it is immediacy in caresses and in the contact of saying. It is the immediacy of a skin and a face” (85), which supports the fact that Hermione is simply answering the approach of the Other (Polixenes), and because she does not weigh the ramifications of her actions (has acted instinctively) it can be said that she has acted fully in accordance with Levinasian responsibility. Camillo’s refusal to poison Polixenes on Leontes’ orders and his musings on the matter (Shakespeare 1.2.357-362) may seem like an act based on the idea of the one-for-the-other, but because it is a conscious choice mingled with fear for himself and rationalized as such, it cannot be considered as taking on responsibility for the Other. To further highlight the fact that the only person who took responsibility for the Other (Hermione) becomes the victim, Shakespeare has Antigonus accentuate Leontes’ lack of an appropriate response to the Other by saying “Be certain what you do, sir, lest your justice Prove violence” (Shakespeare 2.1.127-128). Edgoose explains that Derrida, much like Levinas, “believes that caring justice (juste) is born out of attention to many particular Others. It is defined by its very plurality” (269) which is interesting because it appears as though Leontes was created exactly to show this point, becoming the very antithesis of Edgoose’s observation as he acts unjustly towards a multitude of Others.

**Injustice and the Matriarch**

Much like Leontes, Phaedra acts unjustly towards numerous others as shown in her conversations with the Doctor and Strophe. To further clarify the fact that Phaedra is as yet unable to be responsible for the
Other, she explains the commoner's gifts to Hippolytus as a “token of their esteem” (Kane 75); this suggests that she has not understood the fact that their gifts are just a choice made to get close to Hippolytus even though she does explicitly mention that they wanted to have their picture taken with him. Hippolytus explains that he hates people, and also that he thinks “about having sex with everyone” (Kane 77-79); the significance of the aforementioned sentiments lies in that Hippolytus could be trying to force whoever he has sex with to accept his approach as Other in the way that Levinasian responsibility dictates, but as no one does, he becomes emotionally distant and indicates that he does not feel anything during sex. This takes on new meaning when has relations with Phaedra because it plays out much like all his other sexual encounters. After having sex, Hippolytus asks Phaedra why she wants it to happen again to which she replies “Pleasure?” (Kane 81) which indicates her uncertainty. Phaedra’s uncertainty may be a sign that she is starting to unknowingly take responsibility for Hippolytus by answering his needs even if they are to her own detriment. Levinas states that “Subjectivity is not antecedent to proximity...it is in proximity, which is a relationship...that every commitment is made” (86); so perhaps it can be concluded that Phaedra’s uncertainty is because she is still only beginning to feel the effects of proximity to the other and has not yet fully metabolised it to gain her subjectivity. It is noteworthy that two of the characters who gain subjectivity in the play (Hermione, Phaedra) meet with unpleasant ends, even though their ultimate fates are in stark contrast.

In Hermione’s trial, Leontes exclaims that “thou Shalt feel our justice” to which Hermione retorts “The bug which you would fright me with I seek” (Shakespeare 3.2.88-91) meaning that she has no fear of death. It is ironic that Leontes should speak of justice when he has shown none towards the Other or the third party. Levinas explains that the “one-penetrated-by-the-other” is actually “sacrificed rather than sacrificing itself, for it is precisely bound to the...suffering of pain. This existence, with sacrifice imposed on it, is without conditions. The subjectivity of a subject is vulnerability” (49-50); this supports the conclusion that Hermione has gained subjectivity because she is sacrificed without a choice in the matter, and she even verbalises her vulnerability to Leontes’ shameful treatment of her when she explains that she is kept from her son and her daughter is banished to die. This part of the play finds its significance in that it is in these proceedings that Leontes dismisses the oracle which ultimately leads to his son and Hermione’s death, and only after these tragic events does he realise his mistake. He then says “Apollo, pardon My great Profaneness ’gainst
thine oracle. I’ll reconcile” (Shakespeare 3.2.151-153). However, his attempts at trying to take responsibility are in vain as they are shown to be a conscious choice, and thus, his failure in being one-for-the-other (tried to become one-for-the-other) has the dire outcome of causing Hermione’s death. These events emphasize the importance of the notion of one-for-the-other being the antecedent to subjectivity and consciousness.

Sacrifice and Motherhood

Hippolytus asks Phaedra whether she hates him now that she has found out he has an STD, and she says she does not while also enquiring about why he hates her to which he replies that it is because she hates herself (Kane 85). This is the last time Phaedra speaks in the play, and this is noteworthy because she, just like Leontes, realises too late that she had not taken proper responsibility for the Other. As such, she hangs herself as sacrifice to finally give Hippolytus what he has always wanted: to be treated like everybody else and not simply a spectacle to take a picture with. Phaedra’s sacrifice was a choice unlike Hermione, so their claims to subjectivity and one-for-the-otherness differ. Phaedra and Hippolytus meet violent ends while Hermione is awakened and reconciled with Leontes; so, this difference can be put down to the fact that Hermione treated the approach of the Other ethically while Phaedra did not (at least not at first). Bernasconi states Levinas believes “mortality renders concern for one’s own being senseless. But sacrifice confers a meaning on death, saving it from being an absurdity”, further elaborating that “Levinas explains sacrifice as a being-for-death as a way of being for that which is after me” (12-13). The aforementioned supports the idea that even though Phaedra failed where one-for-the-other is concerned when living, in her death she embodied being for that which is after her (Hippolytus). Therefore, Phaedra manages to act ethically through her sacrifice even though it was a conscious choice.

Phaedra and Hermione’s deaths create a turning point after which one starts to come across characters exhibiting more ethical qualities as far as taking responsibility for Others is concerned. Chanter explains that “in characterizing the feminine as Other, Levinas is far from simply assuming the dominance of the male as ego or sameness” (45); so, these female characters embody Levinas’ Other because they challenge the ego seen as male through their responsible nature. Antigonus recounts his dream explaining that Hermione told him what to name her child and where to take her; Hermione tells Antigonus that he shall not see his wife because of the task he has been chosen to carry out (Shakespeare 3.3.34-36). Levinas explains the self as “Vulnerability, exposure to
outrage, to wounding, passivity more passive than all patience” calling it a substitution and expiation which is in line with his idea of responsibility for the Other as a “passivity more passive than all passivity, an exposure to the other without this exposure being assumed” (15). Thus, the figure of Antigonus, when looked at from the angle of passivity and exposure, is shown to be a responsible character; his being responsible stems from the fact that Hermione comes to him in a dream, and one would find it difficult to find a situation where one is more passive than in a dream. Therefore, Antigonus is exposed to Hermione without the exposure being assumed, and he is ordered by her and abides; he does embody expiation for the other, and there is ultimate passivity in his exposure in which he feels pain, cries and witnesses Hermione’s pain. Gans mentions that one is “called by the face of the Other to awaken as if from a dream” and forced to drop his “cover story...defenses...masks” (88); Hermione’s invasion of Antigonus’ psyche plays out the scenario that Gans envisions, and thus the outcome of her invasion can be said to spell out Antigonus’ responsible nature.

Strophe presents a peculiar case after her mother’s death; she says that if Hippolytus had not raped her mother, she would stand by him, and this conditional support points to her inability to embody one-for-the-Otherness, though she does go on to explain that she would die for a family which Hippolytus mentions she is barely a part of (Kane 85). Hippolytus on the other hand proves that he embodies being for the Other as he tells Strophe to blame him for everything, and he also says that it is easier if Strophe believes Phaedra’s note (Kane 89-90). Hippolytus is overjoyed to find out that the Other (Phaedra) has taken responsibility for his needs. Levinas, when talking about self and subjectivity, states that “In the trauma of persecution it is to pass from the outrage undergone to the responsibility for the persecutor, and, in this sense from suffering to expiation for the other” (111). The aforementioned explains Phaedra’s actions vividly; she is persecuted (both by the Other’s (Hippolytus) face, and by herself) because of her relationship with Hippolytus, but instead of reacting with outrage, through her note she gives Hippolytus what he has always wanted, and it is in this manner that she expiates for the Other. Therefore, Hippolytus realizes that someone has taken responsibility for him and becomes exultant. As such, in both plays, a noticeable change can be seen in relation with characters gaining subjectivity through contact with the Other.

The Clown and the Priest
A point of irony should be noted when Shakespeare’s play introduces the Clown; he ends up leaving to bury a stranger should anything be left of him after being attacked by a bear (Shakespeare 3.3.122). The irony lies in the fact that he is one of the only characters who is immediately shown to be responsible for the other without regard for themselves. So, his offer of a burial for a stranger is a suitable example of being for the Other when he could have easily shirked the aforesaid responsibility. Furthermore, when the Clown comes across Autolycus, he offers a helping hand once more (Shakespeare 4.3), proving yet again he is an emblem of one-for-the-Other, and what accentuates the aforementioned is that he has his pocket picked even though he has acted ethically. The Clown’s designation and being duped as a result of taking responsibility for the Other seems like an attempt to produce an effect which brings the reader back to reality as it is shown that goodness is not always answered with goodness. Levinas states that “Goodness gives to subjectivity its irreducible signification” (18), and that “passivity of the subject” is a “goodness despite oneself” with “despite” being “unexceptionable responsibility...suffering in the offering of oneself” (54). Thus, it can be said that the Clown gains subjectivity through his goodness which makes him vulnerable through unobjectionable responsibility which makes him suffer (has his money stolen) because he offered himself to the Other.

Boothroyd believes that “theology as much as philosophy (qua ontology) is on trial in Levinas’s work” (15) which seems to also be the case for Phaedra’s Love. The sixth scene of Kane’s play sees Hippolytus locked up in a cell and visited by a priest; it is almost as if he has gone from one prison to another, from a palace to a prison both greatly resembling one another. From the beginning of the play, one gets the feeling that Hippolytus is aware that he needs an approach from the Other to gain subjectivity but such an approach never comes until Phaedra’s sacrifice who represented the only person who took responsibility for Hippolytus; Phaedra gained subjectivity through her sacrifice and Hippolytus was able to do the same through glorifying her suicide. As Phaedra was the only embodiment of for-the-Other Hippolytus encountered, before her approach the palace symbolized Hippolytus’ being, and after Phaedra’s death, the cell now represents Hippolytus’ being which he is unable to escape because no one takes responsibility for him, and consequently he cannot take responsibility for anyone else as the world has taken the only one who was-for-him. Losing Phaedra freed Hippolytus in the sense that he saw someone was willing to take responsibility for him but it also led to his withdrawal from being-for-the-other because he realized no one would be willing to
do what Phaedra did for him; this is why he tells the priest that he finds his joy within (Kane 93). An interesting point of contrast arises here regarding how the two plays present responsibility; Shakespeare uses a character associated with the ridiculous (the Clown) to represent goodness whereas Kane uses the Priest, an otherwise serious archetype, to represent the lack of goodness. The Clown adheres to clerical ideals more than the Priest does (who only speaks the words); additionally, it can be said that the Priest resembles Autolycus more than anyone else as he, just like Autolycus, commits thievery by robbing Hippolytus of his right to come to relative peace before his death accentuated by the fact that he is selfish because he uses Hippolytus for sex just like everyone else. Purcell explains Levinas’ idea regarding theology saying “Theology will only ever be worthy of the name when it is attentive to the holiness of the neighbor”, and that the “glimpse of holiness is revealed in the other person, through whom alone one can gain access to God” (45). The Priest in the play makes a mockery of religion through his empty words and reprehensible actions, and thus, cannot gain subjectivity nor allow Hippolytus to achieve it. Hippolytus once again appears as a mirror held up to the world to reveal its hypocrisies.

Unethical Fatherhood

When Polixenes, in disguise, asks Florizel whether his father knows of his intention to get married without his knowledge Florizel replies “He neither does nor shall” (Shakespeare 4.4.387). When Polixenes does away with his disguise he calls Florizel “too base” because he is trying to unite a scepter with a sheep-hook (Shakespeare 4.4.411-413). This father-son dynamic appears in part as a cautionary tale; Polixenes seems as though he is committing the same injustice toward Florizel that Leontes did against Hermione, yet he does not hesitate to reprimand his son even though he himself was discriminated against. Nichols states that when Florizel shows that he is quite different compared to his father, Polixenes threatens him and his lover (149). However, where ethics is concerned, father and son resemble one another greatly as neither is willing to take responsibility for the Other; Polixenes is unwilling to allow his son pursue love while Florizel resists the hints from Polixenes (in disguise) to involve his father as it is his right to be involved in his son’s nuptials. Neither party is willing to forgo his rights and interest to help the Other, and they both simultaneously act without justice in relation to Perdita, Florizel for not listening to her warnings, and Polixenes for not thinking of her interests for even a second. Levinas explains that “the breakup of essence is ethics”, so in order to be ethical a “disinterestedness” (14) has to exist before anything else which is
obviously not the case for Polixenes or Florizel who only think of
themselves. In contrast to Florizel and Polixenes is Perdita because she
is willing to forgo her own interests in order to save Florizel; she is willing
to maintain her lowly station instead of a wealthy life if it means sparing
Florizel the wrath of his father.

In Kane’s play there is also a portrayal of less-than-deserving father
figures one of which is the Priest who comes to get Hippolytus to repent.
The Priest calls Hippolytus son to which Hippolytus replies “You’re not
my father. He won’t be visiting” (Kane 92). In one sentence Hippolytus
ridicules the notion of fatherhood because he is faced with two father
figures neither of whom were willing to sacrifice anything for him as
Theseus abandoned him and the Priest used him for his own interests.
Hippolytus even rejects the notion of motherhood when the Priest asks
him whether he feels joy at his mother’s death and says that she was
not his mother thereby rejecting relation perhaps because he has not
gained anything from his other relations like his father; he simply says
she was human, which is a damning indictment of his father. Hippolytus,
from the start of the play, did not pay much credence to family relations,
and he does not change his view here. The family unit perhaps should
represent the most ethical human gathering as members are thought to
be able to sacrifice for one another because of how close they are, yet
Hippolytus’ family have never exhibited such an inkling. As a result of
this lack of responsibility in his family, he becomes disillusioned which is
further accentuated by the fact that he only sees sacrifice from someone
who is not a blood relative.

Nobility redeemed and damned

The final act of The Winter’s Tale begins with Leontes lamenting his
mistake in counting Hermione guilty; he speaks of the wrong he did
himself (Shakespeare 5.1.9). What Leontes says could simply be seen as
him saying that as he was the reason for Hermione’s death, he has left
himself without an heir which is what he attests to. However, the wrong
he committed against himself could also be seen as the fact that he lost
the chance to gain subjectivity through taking responsibility for the
Other after her approach. Paulina calls Hermione “unparalleled”
(Shakespeare 5.1.16) which not only could be an indication that she was
one of the only people who took responsibility for her Other but also
that the wrong Leontes committed against himself was very significant.
Leontes himself says there are “No more such wives; therefore, no wife”
(Shakespeare 5.1.55) which speaks volumes about the mistake he made,
and also sheds light on the fact that people such as Hermione are few
and far between as well as showing that ethical people like her are
mistreated. Even though Leontes realizes the aforesaid he still acts unethically towards Florizel when he is first told of his imminent approach; Leontes says that his visit and demeanor is unlike his father and must be out of need or accident (Shakespeare 5.1.89-92), and this indicates that Leontes has not fully learned his lesson yet. However, Leontes tells Florizel he has wronged his father before, and this perhaps leads Leontes to promise to help Florizel even though he finds out that Florizel has come to him under false pretenses.

*Phaedra’s Love* differs from Shakespeare’s play in that there is not nearly as much admission of guilt like Leontes’ admissions mentioned above. For example, the Priest mentions that because “Royalty is chosen” (Kane 93) they are more responsible for Others which flies directly in the face of Levinasian thought where every person is equally and infinitely responsible for the Other. Levinas elucidates saying “The more I answer the more I am responsible...This debt which increases is infinity” (93), and thus, a person’s status has no bearing on his responsibility because no matter how much you pay, the debt owed can never be paid off so a limit cannot be conceived for ordinary people which is to be surpassed by royalty. Perpich writes that “In every day contexts, we speak of responsibility for what one has done oneself, for what is one’s own doing” explaining that Levinas speaks of a different kind of responsibility beyond what one does (2) which makes clear the fact that ethical responsibility cannot be measured and thus be different for different people. The Priest sees Hippolytus as the guardian of the country’s morals yet takes no responsibility himself and is quite the hypocrite because he acts quite immorally himself and has sexual relations with Hippolytus. Additionally, the Priest having sex with Hippolytus shows that others still refuse responsibility in the play, not just everyday responsibility but the ethical kind as well.

**Wonder, violence, and the Other**

Before the final scene of Shakespeare’s play, the Clown shows once more how he is the playwright’s conduit in foreshadowing a better tomorrow; the Clown tells Autolycus that even though he knows Autolycus will get up to his old tricks again, he will vouch for him to Florizel. Levinas believes that the “inability to decline [exposure] indicates the anachronism of a debt preceding the loan” (112), and thus the Clown’s willingness to do something which might not seem logical speaks of something beyond his being pushing him to responsibility towards the Other. In the final scene of the play, Leontes says “Your gallery Have we pass’d through, not without much content in many singularities; but we saw not...the statue of her mother” (Shakespeare 5.3.10-14). Leontes’
reference to “singularities” and his words in general are symbolic of how the play has so far panned out; the gallery resembles the play in which there are many characters (singularities) which could not achieve subjectivity as they refused responsibility for the Other, and thus, the word singularities is quite ironic as individuality is gained through being for the Other. Paulina points out Leontes’ wonder in coming face to face with a stone version of Hermione, and he is shown to be in complete awe of her; additionally, Leontes call himself more stone than the statue which indicates that he is finally taking his responsibility to his late wife seriously and acting ethically. Perdita says “Lady Dear Queen, that ended when I but began” (Shakespeare 5.3.45); her words indicate that she somehow feels guilty as if she was the reason for her mother’s passing which highlights the feeling of unending debt she feels, and this points to her ethical nature. Leontes then asks for the curtains to remain open as if to keep repaying his debt by suffering showing that the characters are one by one embodying ethical responsibility. Also, Hermione coming to life saying she sustained herself to see her daughter proves she carried on her maternal and thus ethical responsibilities.

Whereas the closing scenes of Shakespeare’s play were filled with wonder in reaction to the Other, in Kane’s play, in the closing stages, the wonder of the Other turns extremely violent. Theseus, realizing he has failed in his debt to Phaedra, becomes violent and hurts himself vowing to kill Hippolytus (Kane 97-98). This exhibits how Theseus is acting without any justice towards Hippolytus who is the third party which requires the said justice. The scenes of violence continue as Hippolytus is escorted through the crowd indicating the approach of the Other turning vicious. Strophe pleads with the crowd to have mercy on Hippolytus but they have already shown their unwillingness in taking responsibility for the Other. Theseus mirrors the crowd in condemning Strophe, grabs her, rapes her, and kills her, also cutting up Hippolytus. When Theseus realizes what he has done to his daughter, his horror in how he dealt with his Other overwhelms him and he commits suicide. Theseus shows no paternal responsibility which is evidenced by him abandoning his children, and thus, his neglect of his duty is the reason why, when he is in proximity with the Other, violence ensues. Burggraeve explains that “the economic pursuit of autonomy, which makes not only the world but also the other person a ‘means of existence and self-development,’ brings us immediately to another, radical form of evil: interhuman violence” (37). Based on Burggraeve’s views, the relationship of the characters does not resemble an ethical one and is more akin to an economic struggle for individuality which is why it inevitably ends in violence.
Concluding Remarks

The two plays appeared similar to certain extents at particular junctures; however, as they progressed, they started to paint two comprehensively different pictures and outcomes, diverging completely by their respective conclusions. Levinas mentions that “responsibility for the other, the proximity of the neighbor, does not signify a submission to the nonego; it means an openness in which being’s essence is surpassed in inspiration” (115), and accordingly, in the first part of the analysis it was shown that the characters examined could not go beyond their being as responsibility was portrayed as the consequence of choice. Levinas explains that the “fact that the other, my neighbor, is also a third party with respect to another, who is also a neighbor, is the birth of thought, consciousness, justice and philosophy” (128) which did not take place in the plays as in the following part of the analysis, it was explained that the third party in both plays was refused justice, and thus, the characters did not act ethically as Leontes, Polixenes and Hermione’s relationship as well as Phaedra, Hippolytus and Strophe’s relationship suggested, and thus, consciousness was never achieved. The next part provided the realization that Leontes and Phaedra acted unjustly toward numerous Others, and they were unable to adequately digest the approach of the Other to act responsibly. As Levinas explicates the “contemporaneousness of the multiple is tied about the diachrony of two: justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off” (159), which shows how Leontes and Phaedra failed their duties as they acted unjustly toward multiple neighbouring Others. A comparison between Leontes and Phaedra results in awareness of the fact that they both realize too late that they have failed to take responsibility for the Other; alternatively, perhaps the fact that they did not act immediately, without forethought, and unconsciously in a responsible and ethical manner, caused certain deaths.

Levinas believes the “The approach, inasmuch as it is a sacrifice, confers a sense on death” (129); thus, the death of the two matriarchs was shown to create a turning point with characters exhibiting more ethical behavior afterwards. Characters such as Antigonus are shown to be ethically inclined, and indeed even Phaedra herself becomes responsible through the sacrifice she makes for Hippolytus. The following section of the analysis provided an interesting point of divergence between the plays; the Clown for Shakespeare provided an ethical character while the Priest was an unethical persona for Kane. The manner through which the two writers approach ethics can be summed up in the clash which happens when comparing the aforesaid
characters. Kane’s more biting criticism becomes clearer when one considers that the Priest closely resembles Autolycus. The two plays also offer similar views on father figures, both criticizing the lack of responsibility they portray to their kin; Leontes, Polixenes, and Theseus, in one way or another, manage to let their families down as a result of acting unethically. A difference between the two plays was stated as the admission of guilt which occurs frequently in Shakespeare’s but not Kane’s play; Leontes continually laments his mistake but no character mirrors his behavior in Kane’s work. Finally, Shakespeare’s play promises a better tomorrow, be it through the Clown’s responsible nature or Leontes’ realizations, and the wonder in coming face to face with the Other is shown as positive because the characters manage to find their ethical selves. Levinas states that “breakdown of essence is needed, so that it not be repelled by violence” (185); however, in Kane’s play the complete opposite occurs, and the wonder in the approach of the Other turns immensely violent, to the point that all the main characters experience violent ends. It is in this manner that Shakespeare provides hope while Kane can only envision a vicious and violent future. Urban states that “Kane gives us a world of catastrophe” with hers being a “theater that offers neither solutions nor redemption”, further explaining that even in spite of the aforesaid, Kane does emerge from “calamity with the possibility that an ethics can exist between wounded bodies” (37) much like Hippolytus and Phaedra.

Works Cited
ČITANJE PO LEVINASU ŠEKSPIROVE ŠEKSPIROVE ZIMSKU BAJKU I FEDRINE LJUBAVI SARE KEJN

Ovo istraživanje ima za cilj da uporedi Šekspirovu Zimsku bajku (1623) sa Fedrinom ljubavlju (1996) Sare Kejn sa stanovišta Levinasovih ideja o odnosu bića i Drugog izloženih u njegovom ključnom djelu Drugačije od bivstva ili S onu stranu bivstvovanja (1978). Centralna zbivanja u ove dvije drame analizirana su na osnovu teksta, kako bi se osvijetile sličnosti i razlike koje dva dramska teksta imaju u pogledu načina na koji tretiraju Drugog. U analizi je od najveće važnosti kako se likovi drame nose s odgovornošću za Drugoga, kao i kako reaguju na čudo suočavanja s Drugim. Može se zaključiti da u Šekspirovoj drami likovi uglavnom ne izvršavaju svoju etičku odgovornost, a oni koji to rade ne prolaze dobro; međutim, kako radnja odmiče, oni počinju da preuzimaju odgovornost jedni za druge što dovodi do prevladujuće srećnog kraja. U drami Kejneve, nasuprot tome, nema sretnog kraja, jer velika većina likova ne shvata svoju odgovornost, pa njihovo čudo suočavanja s Drugim prerasta u ekstremno nasilje. Uz to, čak i oni protagonisti koji prihvate svoju odgovornost doživljavaju istu jezivu sudbinu kao i oni koji ne otjelovljuju etičku odgovornost.

Ključne riječi: odgovornost, bitak, Drugi, nasilje